Case Details
Case Name: Danish Karim v. Ranjana Chowdhury
Court: Calcutta High Court
Bench: Division Bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya
Date of Judgment: 20 July 2026
Citation: F.A.T. 22 of 2026
Introduction
Mediation is meant to help estranged couples talk things out, not to become another hurdle they must clear before the law will even hear them. In Danish Karim v. Ranjana Chowdhury, the Calcutta High Court had to deal with a rather peculiar situation: a couple who had already agreed to end their marriage by mutual consent found their joint divorce petition dismissed, not because either of them objected to the divorce, but because they had not shown up for a court-ordered mediation session. The Division Bench used this appeal to reaffirm a simple but important point, that mediation is a consensual process, and a court cannot compel unwilling parties into it, least of all when both sides have already agreed on the very outcome mediation is meant to help achieve.
Facts of the Case
Danish Karim and Ranjana Chowdhury had jointly filed a petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, before the Additional District Judge, Sealdah. As part of the proceedings, the trial court had directed the parties to appear before a mediator.
The parties did not comply with this direction. Their counsel also did not inform the trial court that the mediation had not taken place. When the matter came up again, the trial judge treated this omission as a deliberate violation of the court’s earlier order. He remarked that the conduct of the parties and their lawyers was “not at all praiseworthy,” and stated that he was not inclined to extend any “soft attitude” towards them. On this basis, by an order dated 15 January 2026, the trial court dismissed the matrimonial suit altogether.
Aggrieved by this outcome, Danish Karim, the appellant, approached the Calcutta High Court. What makes this case a little unusual is that the respondent, Ranjana Chowdhury, was not actually opposing him. Both had been joint applicants before the trial court, and before the High Court too, counsel for both parties argued along the same lines: that mediation is meaningful only when the parties are willing to participate in it, and that a joint petition for divorce by mutual consent, already reflecting the parties’ shared decision to separate, should not have been thrown out simply because they skipped a mediation session neither of them wanted.
Issues Before the Court
The appeal raised a few connected questions for the Division Bench to consider:
1. Whether a court can dismiss a joint petition for divorce by mutual consent solely on the ground that the parties failed to attend court-ordered mediation.
2. Whether mediation, as contemplated under Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), can be forced upon parties without their consent.
3. Whether the trial court’s characterisation of the non-appearance as a “deliberate violation,” justifying dismissal of the suit, was legally sustainable.
Arguments of the Parties
This was not a conventional adversarial appeal, since both the appellant and the respondent were aligned in what they wanted from the Court. Counsel appearing for both Danish Karim and Ranjana Chowdhury submitted that mediation depends entirely on the willingness of the parties involved. They argued that since the couple had already decided, jointly, to dissolve their marriage by mutual consent, there was simply nothing left to mediate. Their failure to appear before the mediator, they contended, could not be treated as a ground to invalidate an otherwise valid joint application.
There was, in effect, no party defending the trial court’s reasoning before the High Court. The Bench therefore had to independently examine whether the trial judge’s approach, treating non-participation in mediation as fatal to the divorce petition, was legally sound.
Judgment
The Division Bench found merit in the parties’ shared submissions and allowed the appeal by consent. It set aside the trial court’s judgment and decree dated 15 January 2026, which had dismissed the matrimonial suit. The matter was remanded to the trial court, with a direction that the parties’ joint application under Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act be disposed of afresh, in accordance with law, within the statutory timeline prescribed for such petitions.
In doing so, the High Court did not merely correct an individual error; it used the opportunity to lay down a clear principle for trial courts to follow in similar situations going forward.
Reasoning of the Court
The Division Bench’s reasoning rested on a straightforward reading of the law governing mediation, combined with a practical understanding of what mutual consent divorce petitions actually involve.
The Court explained that the statutory basis for referring disputes to mediation is Section 89 of the CPC, which does extend to matrimonial proceedings. However, it stressed that a reference to mediation under this provision can only be made where the parties themselves agree to it. Consent, in other words, is not a formality but the very foundation of the process. As the Bench put it, the consent of both parties is a “sine qua non” for referring a matter to mediation, and parties cannot be forced against their will to undergo it.
The Court then drew an important distinction between contested matrimonial disputes and petitions for divorce by mutual consent. In a contested case, where the parties disagree about whether the marriage should continue, courts are expected to explore reconciliation, and mediation can play a genuine role in that process. But a mutual consent petition is fundamentally different: there is little or no scope for adjudicating disputes on merits, because the parties have already agreed on the outcome. If the parties do not wish to reconcile, the Court reasoned, there is no scope for mediation at all, and a mandatory recourse to it cannot be “forcibly thrust upon them.”
Applying this reasoning to the facts, the Bench held that the trial court had proceeded on a “palpable misconception of law.” It went further, describing the trial judge’s view, that the parties were under a mandatory obligation to undergo mediation, as “absolutely perverse and contrary to basic legal tenets,” and characterised the overall approach as “completely de hors the law.” This is fairly strong language for an appellate court to use, and it signals just how clearly the High Court felt the trial court had misapplied settled procedural principles.
Significance of the Judgment
This judgment matters because it draws a clean, practical line between two very different kinds of matrimonial proceedings, contested divorces and mutual consent divorces, and clarifies that they cannot be treated the same way when it comes to mediation. Courts across the country have increasingly leaned on mediation and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to ease the burden on family courts and encourage reconciliation. This case is a useful reminder that mediation’s strength lies precisely in its consensual character, and turning it into a mandatory checkbox, especially for couples who have already reached an agreement, defeats its purpose entirely.
The ruling also has a more human dimension. Couples who jointly approach a court for a mutual consent divorce have usually already been through a difficult, often long process of separation, negotiation, and emotional adjustment. Making their legal relief conditional on attending a mediation session neither of them wants adds an unnecessary procedural burden to what should be a comparatively straightforward process. By setting aside the dismissal and remanding the matter for fresh disposal, the High Court ensured that the couple’s shared decision would not be held hostage to a procedural misstep.
Finally, the case is a useful precedent for practitioners and trial courts dealing with Section 89 CPC in the matrimonial context. It reiterates that mediation orders, however well-intentioned, cannot be used as a disciplinary tool against parties or their counsel, and that dismissal of a substantive petition is a disproportionate consequence for non-compliance with a procedural direction that itself required the parties’ consent in the first place.
Conclusion
Danish Karim v. Ranjana Chowdhury is a fairly short appeal, but it makes an important point clearly and firmly: mediation cannot be forced on people, and a court cannot punish parties for not doing something the law never actually obligated them to do without their consent. By distinguishing mutual consent divorce petitions from contested matrimonial disputes, and by firmly rejecting the trial court’s mechanical, almost punitive approach, the Calcutta High Court reaffirmed that procedure exists to serve substantive justice, not the other way around. For a couple who had already agreed to part ways amicably, the judgment ensured that their case would finally be heard on its own terms, rather than being derailed by a mediation session nobody wanted in the first place.
References
1. LiveLaw, “Trial Court Cannot Force Parties To Undergo Mediation In Mutual Consent Divorce Cases: Calcutta High Court,” 22 July 2026.
2. Calcutta High Court, judgment in Danish Karim v. Ranjana Chowdhury, F.A.T. 22 of 2026, decided on 20 July 2026.
3. The Special Marriage Act, 1954, Section 28.
