Introduction
The Constitution of India provides different routes for the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court. While most judges are appointed from among High Court judges and a smaller number are appointed directly from the Bar, the Constitution also contains a third and lesser-known route. Article 124(3)(c) permits the appointment of a person who is, in the opinion of the President, a “distinguished jurist” as a Judge of the Supreme Court.
This provision has existed since the Constitution came into force in 1950. However, more than seven decades later, not a single person has been appointed as a Supreme Court Judge through this route. The issue recently received attention after Supreme Court Judge Justice Ujjal Bhuyan questioned why the constitutional provision has remained unused for more than 76 years.
The question, therefore, is not whether Article 124(3)(c) exists—it clearly does—but why India has never used this constitutional route.
What Does Article 124(3) Provide?
Article 124(3) lays down the qualifications for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court. A person must be a citizen of India and must satisfy any one of three conditions.
First, under Article 124(3)(a), the person must have been a Judge of a High Court for at least five years, either in one High Court or in two or more High Courts in succession.
Second, under Article 124(3)(b), the person must have been an advocate of a High Court for at least ten years, either in one High Court or in two or more High Courts in succession.
Third, under Article 124(3)(c), the person may qualify if he or she is, in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist.
The first two routes have been used throughout the history of the Supreme Court. Judges have generally come through the High Court judiciary, while some have been appointed directly from the Bar. The third route, however, has never been used.
Who Is a “Distinguished Jurist”?
One of the main difficulties with Article 124(3)(c) is that the Constitution does not define the expression “distinguished jurist.”
A jurist is generally understood as a person with deep knowledge and expertise in law. In the context of this provision, the expression is commonly associated with eminent legal scholars, law professors, constitutional experts and academics who have made significant contributions to legal thought and jurisprudence.
Importantly, Article 124(3)(c) does not prescribe a minimum number of years of practice or judicial experience for such a person. Unlike the five-year requirement for a High Court judge or ten-year requirement for an advocate, the clause focuses on the person’s distinction as a jurist. The constitutional text specifically leaves the determination to the President’s opinion.
Therefore, the provision appears to have been designed to create a different pool of candidates for the Supreme Court—one based primarily on exceptional legal scholarship rather than courtroom or judicial experience.
Why Was This Provision Included?
The idea behind Article 124(3)(c) was to prevent the Supreme Court from being limited only to people following traditional judicial careers.
The Supreme Court does not only decide ordinary disputes. It deals with constitutional interpretation, fundamental rights, federalism, administrative law, international law and other complex legal questions. A person who has spent years studying and researching these areas may bring a different perspective to the Bench.
The Constituent Assembly also discussed the possibility of appointing distinguished legal scholars to the higher judiciary. The idea was influenced, among other things, by comparative constitutional experiences in countries such as the United States. The appointment of legal academics to constitutional courts demonstrated that extensive scholarly knowledge could also be considered valuable for judicial office.
Thus, Article 124(3)(c) can be understood as a constitutional attempt to broaden the source of judicial appointments.
Why Has India Never Used Article 124(3)(c)?
There is no single officially established reason explaining why the provision has never been used. However, several institutional and practical factors can help explain the situation.
First, the traditional career path dominates Supreme Court appointments. The Indian higher judiciary has historically developed around two major sources: High Court judges and experienced advocates. These are the people whose professional work is directly visible to the institutions involved in judicial appointments.
A High Court judge already has judicial experience, while a senior advocate has extensive courtroom experience. Therefore, their professional suitability for the Supreme Court is easier to assess through their judgments, arguments, legal practice and reputation.
A legal academic, on the other hand, may have an outstanding record of research and teaching but may not have a comparable courtroom record.
Second, the expression “distinguished jurist” is not clearly defined. The Constitution does not provide a detailed test for determining who qualifies as a distinguished jurist. This creates a degree of uncertainty. Should the person have published a particular number of books? Should the person be a constitutional scholar? Should international recognition be necessary? Should teaching experience be required?
Since there is no constitutional checklist, identifying suitable candidates becomes more complicated.
Third, the present system of judicial appointments has developed around the judiciary and the Bar. Following the Judges Cases, the collegium system became central to appointments to the higher judiciary. The system primarily considers persons from the existing judicial and legal professions. As a result, legal academics have not formed a regular part of the pool from which Supreme Court judges are selected.
Fourth, there is an argument that judges require practical courtroom experience. A Supreme Court judge must understand court procedure, evidence, advocacy and the practical consequences of legal decisions. Since many distinguished jurists are academics rather than practising lawyers, concerns may arise about whether academic expertise alone is sufficient.
However, this is not a constitutional requirement under Article 124(3)(c). The Constitution deliberately created a separate category for a distinguished jurist. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan recently questioned the argument that academics should automatically be excluded because they may lack courtroom experience, suggesting that exceptional legal scholarship can itself contribute to the functioning of the Supreme Court.
What Could a Distinguished Jurist Bring to the Supreme Court?
The inclusion of a distinguished jurist could bring academic and interdisciplinary expertise to the Bench.
A legal scholar may have spent decades studying constitutional law, human rights, international law, comparative constitutional systems or legal theory. Such knowledge may be particularly relevant when the Supreme Court is deciding large constitutional questions.
For example, constitutional cases often require the Court to examine not only previous judgments but also constitutional history, comparative law, legislative developments and competing theories of interpretation.
A distinguished jurist could therefore contribute a perspective developed through long-term legal research and scholarship.
At the same time, this does not mean that academics are automatically better suited to judicial office. Judicial work requires several skills, including impartial decision-making, case management, understanding of arguments and application of law to specific facts. The constitutional provision simply recognises that exceptional legal scholarship can also be a qualification for the highest court.
Is the Provision Completely Unused?
It is important to understand that Article 124(3)(c) itself remains part of the Constitution. It has not been removed or declared invalid. Its status is different from a provision that has become obsolete or legally ineffective.
The Constitution continues to recognise three possible qualification routes for Supreme Court judges. What has remained unused is specifically the distinguished-jurist route.
There was also once a similar provision concerning High Court judges. The 42nd Constitutional Amendment of 1976 inserted a “distinguished jurist” category into Article 217. However, that provision was later removed by the 44th Constitutional Amendment of 1978. The corresponding route continues to exist for Supreme Court appointments under Article 124(3)(c).
The Recent Debate
The issue has gained renewed attention in 2026 after Justice Ujjal Bhuyan highlighted the fact that no distinguished jurist has been appointed to the Supreme Court despite the Constitution being in force for more than 76 years.
Speaking at the convocation of National Law University, Delhi, Justice Bhuyan suggested that eminent legal scholars could contribute to the Bench through their scholarship and legal expertise. He also questioned whether the constitutional provision had been seriously explored by the institutions responsible for judicial appointments.
His remarks have reopened an important constitutional question: if the Constitution deliberately created three routes to the Supreme Court, should one of those routes remain unused indefinitely?
The answer ultimately involves balancing academic expertise with practical judicial experience and considering how the Supreme Court should be composed in the future.
Conclusion
Article 124(3)(c) represents an unusual and important feature of the Indian Constitution. It recognises that the highest court may benefit not only from experienced judges and advocates but also from distinguished legal scholars.
Yet, for more than 76 years, India has never appointed a Supreme Court Judge through this route. The reasons appear to include the dominance of traditional judicial and Bar-based appointments, the absence of a clear constitutional definition of “distinguished jurist”, uncertainty about the method of identifying suitable academics, and concerns regarding courtroom experience.
The provision, however, remains constitutionally valid. Its continued non-use raises a broader question about the diversity of expertise within the Supreme Court. Whether India should eventually appoint a distinguished jurist is a matter for the constitutional authorities and the judicial appointments process. What is clear is that Article 124(3)(c) was designed to keep open a door that India has never yet chosen to enter.
