Abstract
The digitilisation of judicial proceedings has transformed access to justice in India. Judgments, orders, pleadings, and case-related information can now be retrieved almost instantaneously through court websites, search engines, and legal databases. Although this development strengthens institutional accountability and public confidence in the administration of justice, it has also created a competing constitutional concern. Information that was once confined to physical court files may now remain permanently searchable, indexed, and associated with an individual’s name long after the conclusion of the proceedings.
This article examines the constitutional tension between the right to be forgotten and the principle of open justice. It argues that judicial records should not ordinarily be destroyed or permanently erased, because they form part of the institutional memory of the justice system and serve important functions relating to precedent, accountability, legal research, and public scrutiny. Nevertheless, unrestricted name-based indexing of judicial records may cause disproportionate harm to dignity, reputation, livelihood, family life, and personal autonomy, particularly where proceedings have ended in acquittal, discharge, quashing, settlement, or dismissal.
The appropriate constitutional response is therefore not the wholesale disappearance of court records. Instead, Indian courts should adopt calibrated remedies such as de-indexing, de-linking, redaction, anonymisation, masking of personal identifiers, restricted access, and preservation of complete records within the judicial system. Such remedies must remain subject to proportionality, procedural safeguards, statutory restrictions, and the public interest in maintaining transparent courts.
The article further analyses the interaction between Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution, the principles laid down in *K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India*, the open-court principle under Section 367 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, statutory identity protections under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, and the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.
The Right to Be Forgotten allows individuals to request the removal of personal data, creating a direct conflict with judicial transparency principles that ensure public access to court records. Proposed solutions to balance this legal dilemma include sealing sensitive files instead of deleting them, implementing time-based limits for minor offenses, and maintaining public interest exceptions.
Introduction
The Core Concepts
- Right to be Forgotten: A legal rule that lets people ask search engines to delete their personal data so it is no longer easy to find online.
- Judicial Transparency: The principle that court files, trials, and rulings must remain open and public to keep the justice system honest and fair.
- The Tension: Privacy laws try to protect a person’s future and rehabilitation, while transparency laws protect public safety and historical truth.
The constitutional promise of justice requires courts to function in the public view. Open proceedings enable citizens to scrutinise judicial conduct, assess the fairness of adjudication, study the development of legal principles, and hold public institutions accountable. Judicial transparency is therefore not merely an administrative preference. It is an essential attribute of the rule of law.
At the same time, the digital publication of court records has altered the practical meaning of public access. A proceeding that was historically available only to a person who physically attended court, inspected a file, or applied for a certified copy may now become permanently discoverable through a simple search of an individual’s name. The distinction between public availability and universal digital permanence has consequently become constitutionally significant.
The problem becomes particularly acute where a person has been acquitted, discharged, or otherwise exonerated; where criminal proceedings have been quashed; where a matrimonial dispute has been settled; or where an individual’s name appears incidentally in proceedings involving another person. In such circumstances, the continued association between the person and the court record may create a misleading impression of criminality or misconduct, notwithstanding the actual outcome of the case.
The expression “right to be forgotten” describes an individual’s claim to limit the continuing public dissemination or easy retrieval of personal information that is no longer necessary, accurate, relevant, or proportionate to a legitimate public interest. It does not necessarily imply the destruction of history. Its more constitutionally defensible form concerns the regulation of accessibility, searchability, and identification.
The central question is therefore not whether judicial records should be erased as though the proceedings never occurred. The more precise question is whether the State, courts, search engines, and legal databases should be permitted to maintain unlimited name-based access to every judicial record indefinitely, regardless of the case outcome, the individual’s role, the passage of time, or the continuing public interest.
The answer must be developed through a careful reconciliation of privacy and transparency rather than through the automatic supremacy of one constitutional value over the other.
Background
The Right to Be Forgotten (RTBF) and judicial transparency collide when individuals demand the deletion of past court records from the internet to protect their privacy and reputation, threatening the foundational public availability of legal proceedings.
The Core Conflict
- Judicial Transparency (Open Justice): Court records must remain accessible to ensure public scrutiny, accountability, and a reliable historical record of the law.
- The Right to Be Forgotten: Rooted in informational privacy (such as Article 21 in India or the GDPR in Europe), individuals argue that perpetual digital visibility of old, settled, or dismissed cases causes unmerited, lifelong reputational damage.
- The Digital Dilemma: Unlike physical paper archives that fade into obscurity, internet search engines and legal databases replicate and amplify allegations indefinitely—even after an individual has been fully acquitted.
The constitutional foundation of privacy
In *K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India*, the Supreme Court recognised privacy as a constitutionally protected right emerging principally from Article 21 and connected with the freedoms guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution, *K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India*, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
The judgment treated privacy as encompassing bodily integrity, decisional autonomy, dignity, family life, and informational control. Informational privacy concerns the ability of individuals to exercise a degree of control over the collection, use, retention, and dissemination of information concerning them.
The Court also recognised that privacy is not absolute. Any invasion of privacy must satisfy constitutional standards of legality, legitimate State purpose, necessity, and proportionality. The recognition of informational privacy therefore does not create an unrestricted power to suppress every uncomfortable fact. It requires courts to determine whether continued disclosure serves a legitimate and proportionate public purpose.
The Supreme Court’s discussion of the right to be forgotten is particularly important. It acknowledged that a person should not necessarily remain permanently confined to an earlier stage of life or indefinitely exposed to the consequences of past conduct. However, the Court also cautioned that the right could not amount to a general power to erase history. The right must be balanced against freedom of speech, freedom of the press, access to information, and other legitimate public interests.
The principle of open justice
Indian courts have traditionally operated on the presumption that judicial proceedings should be open to the public. The rationale is multifaceted. Public hearings deter arbitrariness, promote judicial discipline, facilitate legal education, strengthen confidence in courts, and permit independent scrutiny of judicial decision-making.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the importance of open courts and public access to judicial proceedings. In *Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra*, the Court recognised the relationship between open justice and public confidence in the administration of justice, *Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra*, AIR 1967 SC 1.
The open-court principle is also reflected in Section 367 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The provision presumes that criminal courts are open to the public, subject to limitations imposed by the presiding Judge or Magistrate. It also mandates in-camera proceedings in specified sexual offences and restricts publication of matters connected with such proceedings.
The statutory framework demonstrates that open justice is not absolute. Indian criminal procedure itself recognises that privacy, dignity, witness protection, and the prevention of secondary victimisation may justify restrictions on public access.
The distinction between court records and search-engine visibility
A significant analytical distinction must be drawn between the preservation of a judicial record and the digital amplification of that record.
A court may retain an unredacted record for institutional, appellate, archival, and precedential purposes while restricting the extent to which personal identifiers are publicly searchable. De-indexing removes or suppresses a link from name-based search results without necessarily deleting the underlying judgment. Masking replaces the name or identifying details in a public-facing version while retaining the complete version within the court’s internal records.
This distinction is central to a proportionate resolution of the conflict. It allows the judicial system to preserve its institutional history while reducing the risk that a person’s name will operate as a permanent digital gateway to sensitive or outdated proceedings.
Facts and Legal Context
Judicial recognition of the right to be forgotten
The right to be forgotten has developed incrementally through constitutional decisions and fact-specific orders of various High Courts. In *Jorawer Singh Mundy v. Union of India*, the Delhi High Court considered the continuing online availability of a criminal judgment relating to a person who had been acquitted. The Court acknowledged the serious prejudice that may result when an acquittal does not prevent the individual’s name from being associated with criminal allegations in online search results.
The Delhi High Court subsequently considered a connected batch of petitions concerning de-indexing, de-linking, anonymisation, and masking of judicial records. In *Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v. Union of India*, decided on May 29, 2026, the Court treated the right to be forgotten as a facet of informational privacy under Article 21. It distinguished between de-indexing and masking and held that de-indexing need not destroy the record. The judgment contemplated continued access through case number, citation, date, court, or other purposeful identifiers, while restricting unrestricted name-based retrieval in appropriate circumstances.
The decision is significant because it conceptualises privacy-compatible access rather than absolute secrecy. It recognises that judicial transparency may be preserved even when casual, unlimited, and name-based digital discoverability is moderated.
Acquittal, discharge, and quashing of criminal proceedings
The continuing publication of allegations after acquittal or discharge raises a distinct constitutional concern. Criminal law proceeds on the presumption of innocence, and a final acquittal or discharge may substantially alter the legal significance of earlier allegations.
A person who has been acquitted is not legally situated in the same manner as a convicted offender. Similarly, the quashing of proceedings may remove the legal basis for continuing to portray the person as an accused in relation to that proceeding. The permanent digital association between the individual’s identity and the original allegation may therefore produce reputational harm disconnected from the final judicial outcome.
This does not mean that every acquittal should automatically result in deletion or masking. The nature of the offence, the reasons for acquittal, the existence of continuing public interest, the status of the accused, and the public significance of the proceedings must be evaluated. A person holding public office or exercising substantial public power may attract a greater legitimate interest in continued disclosure than a private individual involved in a purely personal dispute.
Matrimonial, family, and private civil proceedings
Matrimonial proceedings frequently contain intimate information concerning health, sexuality, family relationships, finances, allegations of cruelty, and private communications. The Supreme Court in *K.S. Puttaswamy* recognised that family life, marriage, and personal relationships fall within the core of constitutionally protected privacy.
The public interest in knowing that a legal dispute occurred does not invariably require the public disclosure of every intimate detail contained in the pleadings or evidence. Courts should distinguish between the legal principle established by a case and unnecessary exposure of the personal lives of the parties.
In appropriate matters, anonymisation, redaction, restricted access, and the removal of personal identifiers may protect privacy without depriving the legal community of access to the ratio decidendi or the operative portion of the judgment.
Protection of victims and children
Indian law already contains specific statutory limitations on the disclosure of personal identity.
Section 72 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, corresponding substantially to Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code, restricts the disclosure of the identity of victims of specified sexual offences. The protection is not merely discretionary. It reflects the legislative determination that the dignity, safety, and rehabilitation of victims justify confidentiality.
Section 367 of the BNSS mandates in-camera proceedings in specified sexual-offence cases and restricts publication of related proceedings.
Section 74 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, prohibits disclosure of information capable of identifying a child involved in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. It also restricts disclosure of the child’s record for character-verification purposes, including after the matter has been closed or disposed of.
These provisions demonstrate that Indian law already recognises limited forms of forgetting, confidentiality, and record protection. The right to be forgotten is therefore not entirely foreign to the Indian legal system. It exists in specific statutory contexts and is increasingly being developed through constitutional adjudication.
The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023
Section 12 of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, provides a right to correction, completion, updating, and erasure of personal data, subject to the necessity of retaining such data for the specified purpose or for compliance with law.
The provision must not be read as automatically authorising the destruction of judicial records. Judicial documents are generated and retained pursuant to legal functions, constitutional obligations, procedural law, archival requirements, and public accountability. Where retention is required by law or serves a legitimate judicial purpose, erasure may not be available.
Nevertheless, the legislation reinforces a broader legal principle that personal data should not remain indefinitely accessible without a lawful, necessary, and proportionate justification. It strengthens the case for procedural mechanisms through which affected individuals may seek correction, restricted dissemination, anonymisation, or other forms of relief.
Important Points
Court records should ordinarily be preserved
Judicial records should not ordinarily disappear. They constitute part of the legal and constitutional history of the nation. They assist appellate courts, facilitate precedent-based reasoning, enable academic research, support the correction of judicial error, and permit scrutiny of governmental and judicial action.
Erasing the underlying record could impair the integrity of the justice system. It could also create the risk that inconvenient decisions, politically sensitive proceedings, or records relating to public misconduct may be removed under the guise of privacy.
The stronger legal position is therefore that the record should be preserved, while access may be structured according to the legitimate interests at stake.
Public access is not identical to unlimited accessibility
The fact that a judgment is a public record does not necessarily establish that every form of dissemination is constitutionally required. Physical inspection, certified-copy access, access through case number, and limited institutional access are materially different from permanent name-based indexing by search engines.
Digital searchability increases the scale, speed, permanence, and social consequences of disclosure. The constitutional analysis must therefore account for the difference between information being technically available and information being continuously amplified.
Relief must be proportionate
The remedy should be tailored to the injury. Courts should consider a hierarchy of measures
- correction of inaccurate information
- addition of the final outcome of the proceedings
- removal of personal addresses and contact details
- redaction of sensitive personal information
- anonymisation of parties
- masking of names in public-facing records
- de-indexing from name-based search results
- restriction of access to specified categories of persons
- preservation of the complete record within the court registry
The least restrictive measure capable of preventing disproportionate harm should ordinarily be preferred.
Conviction and public-interest cases require caution
A broad right to be forgotten should not become a device for concealing convictions, evading public accountability, suppressing reporting concerning public officials, or obstructing legitimate investigation.
Greater caution is necessary where the case concerns offences against women or children, corruption, terrorism, organised crime, serious economic offences, abuse of public office, or conduct bearing directly upon public trust. The public’s right to know may be particularly strong in such matters.
The mere passage of time should not automatically extinguish public interest. A court must examine the continuing relevance of the information and the consequences of suppressing it.
De-indexing is preferable to destruction
De-indexing is often more compatible with open justice than deletion. It leaves the judgment intact while reducing the likelihood that a casual search of a person’s name will reveal a sensitive record unrelated to the person’s current legal status.
The 2026 Delhi High Court framework treated de-indexing as a means of limiting name-based retrieval while preserving access through purposeful identifiers such as case number, citation, court, and date.
The originating court should generally decide masking
Masking alters the publicly accessible version of a judicial record. The court that delivered the judgment or order is generally best placed to assess the factual context, the necessity of disclosure, and the appropriate scope of redaction.
Applications for masking should ordinarily be made before the concerned court, subject to constitutional review where the request is rejected or inadequately considered. This approach promotes institutional competence and prevents inconsistent orders from different forums.
Procedural safeguards are necessary
Courts should avoid granting relief through informal or unreasoned directions. A proper application should disclose
- the identity of the applicant
- the relevant case number and judgment
- the final procedural outcome
- the specific information alleged to cause harm
- the nature of the continuing prejudice
- the steps already taken with the relevant platform
- the public interest consequences of continued disclosure
- the precise relief sought
The affected parties, public authorities, search engines, and legal databases should receive notice where their interests are materially implicated. Orders should record reasons and should specify whether the relief concerns de-indexing, masking, redaction, or restricted access.
Analysis
Balancing Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21
The public’s right to receive information is connected with Article 19(1)(a). Judicial transparency enables citizens to understand how courts exercise public power. It also protects against secret justice and arbitrary adjudication.
The individual’s right to privacy, dignity, reputation, and personal autonomy arises principally from Article 21. Neither right is absolute. The constitutional inquiry must therefore determine whether continued disclosure is lawful, connected with a legitimate objective, necessary to achieve that objective, and proportionate in its impact.
A blanket rule favouring either total secrecy or total publicity would be constitutionally unsatisfactory. The better approach is contextual adjudication guided by proportionality.
The role of reputational harm
Reputation is not merely a social preference. It may affect employment, housing, marriage, education, travel, insurance, professional licensing, and personal safety. Digital records can produce a permanent and disproportionate association between a person and allegations that were never proved.
However, privacy cannot be converted into a right to suppress truthful information solely because it is inconvenient. The relevant question is whether the continued form, manner, and intensity of publication is justified by a legitimate public interest.
For example, a judgment may remain publicly available because it establishes an important legal principle, while the names and personal identifiers of private individuals may be masked. This approach protects both legal transparency and individual dignity.
The danger of judicial overreach
The absence of a comprehensive statutory regime creates a difficult institutional question. Courts must protect fundamental rights, but they should also avoid creating an unstructured administrative system through case-by-case orders lacking uniform standards.
A legislative or rule-based framework would provide clarity concerning
- eligibility for de-indexing
- distinction between public and private proceedings
- treatment of acquittals and convictions
- access by journalists and researchers
- preservation of original records
- duties of court registries
- obligations of search engines and legal databases
- appeal and review procedures
- consequences of non-compliance
Until such a framework is enacted, courts should rely on constitutional principles, existing statutory protections, procedural fairness, and carefully reasoned case-specific directions.
Conclusion
Court records should not ordinarily disappear. The permanent destruction of judicial history would threaten precedent, accountability, legal research, and public confidence in the administration of justice. Judicial transparency remains indispensable to a constitutional democracy.
Nevertheless, the public character of a judicial record cannot justify unlimited and technologically amplified disclosure in every case. A person who has been acquitted, discharged, or otherwise freed from criminal liability may suffer serious and continuing harm when the original allegation remains more visible than the final judicial outcome. Similar concerns arise in matrimonial disputes, private civil proceedings, juvenile cases, and proceedings involving victims of sexual offences.
The right to be forgotten should therefore be understood as a right against disproportionate and unjustified digital retrievability rather than as an unrestricted right to erase history.The Right to Be Forgotten in India explores the balance between individual privacy and the need for judicial transparency and open access to court records. The principal remedies should be de-indexing, de-linking, masking, anonymisation, redaction, correction, and controlled access. The complete judicial record should ordinarily remain preserved within the court’s institutional custody.
The governing principle should be constitutional proportionality. Where public interest requires continuing disclosure, privacy must yield to the extent necessary. Where continued name-based publication serves no substantial public purpose and produces disproportionate harm, the court should be empowered to restrict accessibility while preserving the underlying record.
The most defensible legal position is therefore neither absolute transparency nor absolute forgetting. It is **preserved justice with proportionate privacy**. Indian courts should ensure that judicial records remain available for legitimate legal and democratic purposes, while preventing the digital system from converting a concluded proceeding into a permanent and unjust sentence upon the individual’s identity.
References
Constitutional provisions
Constitution of India, arts. 14, 19(1)(a), 19(2), and 21.
Statutes
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, § 367.
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 72.
Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, § 12.
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, § 74.
Judicial authorities
- S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India*, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
- Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra*, AIR 1967 SC 1.
- Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu*, (1994) 6 SCC 632.
- People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India*, (2003) 4 SCC 399.
- Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India*, (2018) 10 SCC 639.
- Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal*, (2020) 5 SCC 481.
- Jorawer Singh Mundy v. Union of India*, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 2306.
- Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v. Union of India*, W.P. (C) No. 1021 of 2016 and connected matters, Delhi High Court, decided May 29, 2026.
- Jitendra Meena v. State of Rajasthan*, 2024 SCC OnLine Raj 2690.
