Abstract
The right to strike represents one of the most contentious aspects of Indian industrial jurisprudence, embodying the tension between workers’ collective bargaining rights and the state’s interest in maintaining industrial peace. The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (“IRC” or “the Code”), which consolidates earlier labour statutes, introduces significant restrictions on strike activities while ostensibly balancing worker rights with industrial stability. This article critically examines the constitutional validity of these restrictions, analyzing judicial precedents from All India Bank Employees’ Association v. National Industrial Tribunal (1962) to T.K. Rangarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2003). It highlights contradictions between Article 19(1)(c)’s guarantee of freedom of association and statutory limitations on collective action. The article further assesses the Code’s compliance with the doctrine of proportionality and International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions, compares India’s framework with foreign jurisdictions, and concludes with reform recommendations to align industrial peace with constitutional values.
Introduction
The right to strike occupies a complex position in India’s legal framework, balancing workers’ bargaining power with the state’s responsibility to maintain order and ensure productivity. While strikes remain an indispensable tool of collective bargaining, they also disrupt economic stability and essential services.
The Industrial Relations Code, 2020, enacted as part of India’s consolidation of 29 labour laws into four labour codes, redefines strike regulation. By repealing the Trade Unions Act, 1926, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Code restructures collective action through stricter procedural hurdles, longer prohibitions during dispute resolution, and harsher penalties for “illegal” strikes.
Though justified as promoting “ease of doing business” and industrial peace, the Code raises pressing constitutional questions regarding proportionality, freedom of association, and workers’ bargaining power.
Legal Framework
1. Constitutional Provisions
- Article 19(1)(c): Guarantees citizens the right to form associations or unions, though it does not explicitly protect the right to strike.
- Article 19(4): Permits reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order and morality.
- Article 21: Through expansive interpretation (Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1986), encompasses the right to livelihood, indirectly linking to workers’ rights.
- Directive Principles: Article 43 directs the state to secure living wages and humane conditions, guiding labour law interpretation.
2. Statutory Framework under the IRC, 2020
- Definition: Section 2(q) defines “strike” as cessation or refusal to work in combination.
- Notice Requirement: Section 62 requires a 14-day notice before strikes. Strikes are prohibited during conciliation proceedings and up to seven days after, as well as during tribunal proceedings.
- Public Utility Services: Section 63 extends prohibitions for six weeks post-conciliation in public utilities.
- Penalties: Section 77 imposes imprisonment up to one year or fines up to ₹50,000 for “illegal” strikes.
- Expansion of Coverage: More industries are designated as public utilities, widening restrictions.
These measures tilt toward stricter state control, raising questions about constitutional limits.
Judicial Pronouncements
- All India Bank Employees’ Association v. National Industrial Tribunal (1962)
- Held that Article 19(1)(c) guarantees union formation but not the right to strike, which is statutory and subject to regulation.
- Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar (1962)
- Distinguished between peaceful demonstrations (protected under Article 19(1)(a)) and strikes (not guaranteed). Upheld restrictions on government servants’ strikes.
- Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union (1999)
- Declared participation in illegal strikes as misconduct warranting disciplinary action, provided principles of natural justice are observed.
- T.K. Rangarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2003)
- Strongly held that government employees have “no fundamental, legal, moral, or equitable right to strike,” reinforcing the state’s authority in essential services.
Critical Analysis
1. Constitutional Validity and Proportionality
Restrictions must meet the reasonable restriction test under Article 19(4) and the proportionality doctrine (Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978). By broadening the scope of public utilities and criminalising strikes, the Code risks failing proportionality, as it effectively negates workers’ ability to strike in many sectors.
2. Balance Between Industrial Harmony and Rights
While stability is essential, overregulation undermines unions’ bargaining power. Strikes, often a last resort, are reduced to procedural formalities, shifting conflict resolution towards state mechanisms instead of genuine collective negotiation.
3. Ultra Vires Concerns
The imposition of imprisonment for illegal strikes may be challenged as excessive and inconsistent with Article 19 freedoms. Expansion of public utility services risks going beyond constitutional intent, limiting association rights.
Comparative Perspective
- United Kingdom: Allows strikes but requires advance notice and union ballots; restrictions focus on proportionality.
- United States: Protects strike rights under the National Labor Relations Act, with exceptions in essential services.
- France: Strikes are constitutionally protected but regulated in essential services to ensure continuity.
- India: By criminalising strikes and broadly expanding “essential” services, the IRC takes a far more restrictive approach, risking non-compliance with ILO standards.
Conclusion
The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 continues India’s historically restrictive stance on strikes, but goes further by lengthening notice periods, widening prohibitions, and criminalising participation. While justified in the name of industrial peace, such measures disproportionately weaken unions and diminish collective bargaining, potentially clashing with constitutional freedoms and international labour standards.
A balanced approach would:
- Narrowly define “essential services.”
- Encourage democratic strike ballots.
- Strengthen alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
Such reforms would preserve industrial peace without eroding constitutional rights.
References
- Ministry of Labour and Employment, Statement of Objects and Reasons: Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (India).
- Trade Unions Act, 1926 (India) (repealed); Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (India) (repealed); Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (India) (repealed).
- Industrial Relations Code, 2020, Sections 2(q), 62–63, 77 (India).
- All India Bank Employees’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Indus. Tribunal, AIR 1962 SC 171 (India).
- Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166 (India).
- Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Maharashtra Gen. Kamgar Union, (1999) 8 SCC 552 (India).
- T.K. Rangarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2003) 6 SCC 581 (India).
- Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 (India).
- Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp., AIR 1986 SC 180 (India).
- Indian Constitution, Articles 19(1)(c), 19(4), 21, 43.
FAQs
Q1. Does the Constitution guarantee the right to strike?
No. Article 19(1)(c) protects union formation but not the right to strike.
Q2. What changes did the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 bring?
It mandates a 14-day strike notice, extends restrictions for public utilities, expands their scope, and imposes stricter penalties.
Q3. Can government employees strike legally?
No. The Supreme Court has held government employees have no right to strike, and violations invite disciplinary action.
Q4. What are the penalties for illegal strikes?
Up to one year’s imprisonment or a fine of ₹50,000.
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