Supreme Court of India Case number: 1965 AIR 1275 Petitioner Subhas Chandra And Others Respondent Municipal Corporation Of Delhi Mudholkar, J.R. Bench Mudholkar, J.R. Gajendragadkar, P.B. (CJ) Wanchoo, K.N. Hidayatullah, M. Dayal, Raghubar Act: Punjab Municipal Act ss. 232, 235 and 236
Background
Eleven clerical employees affiliated with the Corporation of Delhi have approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the constitution, seeking to annul an order issued on November 5, 1958, by the Commissioner of the Corporation of Delhi. They are petitioning for the issuance of writ of mandamus, along with the other appropriate writs, orders, or directions compelling the respondent to implement a resolution passed on November 1/8, 1957, by the Executive and Finance Sub-Committee of the now-defunct Municipal Committee of Delhi. The primary basis for their claims for relief is that the Commissioner’s actions in issuing the order have resulted in discriminatory treatment against the petitioners.
Facts
The case arose when the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) issued an order that affected the service conditions of certain employees, including Subhas Chandra. The employees challenged this order on the grounds that it was arbitrary and discriminatory, violating their fundamental rights under Article 14 (Right to Equality) of the Indian Constitution. Before 1948, the Municipal Committee hired matriculates and non-matriculates as clerks at a salary range of Rs. 35-2-65-3-95. To attract graduates, they offered a starting salary of Rs. 45. On September 16, 1948, the committee revised staff pay grades based on the Central Pay Commission’s recommendations, creating two junior clerk grades of Rs. 55-3-85-4-125-5-130 for matriculates and Rs. 45-2-55-3-95-4-105 for non-matriculates.
Petitioner’s Claim
The petitioners asserted that the committee, aiming to entice graduates and individuals possessing superior academic credentials while simultaneously incentivizing clerical personnel to engage in further academic pursuits, resolved within the same decree to grant a “graduate allowance” of Rs. 20 per month to graduates employed in the junior grade. This sanction was duly authorized by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, as documented in memorial No. F.2 (102) 48 – L.S.G dated July 26/27, 1949.352.
The committee has ceased disbursing the graduate’s allowance to prospective recruits while maintaining its allocation to prospective recruits while maintaining its allocation to existing permanent and temporary staff. In response, thirty employees submitted a formal appeal to the committee, contesting the restriction of the allowance solely to current recipients. They asserted that the allowance should be extended to all individuals who have successfully completed the B.A examination post 1954. The representation proved effective, prompting the committee to decree the reinstatement of the personal pay system, granting Rs. 20 per month to all graduates within the junior grade, and mandating that the requisite approval from the Chief Commissioner for this initiative be secured.
On 8 November 1957, the committee enacted an amendment to the resolution under resolution no. 701, thereby mandating the removal of the phrase “necessary sanction of the Chief Commissioner be obtained” from the end of the resolution. According to them, this resolution became effective immediately, entitling them to payment with retrospective applicability. However, prior to the execution of this resolution, the Municipal Committee of Delhi was supplanted by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, consequently to the enactment of the Delhi Corporation Act of 1957. The Commissioner acknowledged the entitlement for disbursement of the graduate allowance to those junior-grade clerks of Delhi Municipal Committee who had received authorization to engage in higher studies prior to July 30, 1954, however, this concession was not extended to the remaining eighteen individuals.
The petitioners contented that the Commissioner’s order was discriminatory in nature. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Punjab, only to later withdraw it. Thereafter, they sought redress from the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.
Argument
The petitioner’s application is vigorously contested on behalf of the corporation on two principal grounds. Firstly, it is asserted that the petitioners have approached this court after an inordinate delay. Secondly, it is contended that the impugned order issued by the commissioner was inherently devoid of jurisdiction. The petitioners concede to a delay of approximately five years in submitting their application; however, they elucidate that this interval was necessitated by the pendency of their writ petition in the High Court of Punjab.
They asserted that when an individual endeavors to assert a fundamental right under Article 32, mere temporal delay should not serve as an impediment. It is noteworthy that no resolution from the committee, nor any applicable rule or by-law, has been presented to our attention mandating that an employee must secure the committee’s approval prior to embarking on higher studies. Consequently, there exists no justifiable rationale for differentiating the petitioners from the 12 individuals in question. The petitioners further interrogate the legal authority of the commissioner to entertain the claims of those 12 individuals.
Mr. Patwardhan, from the respondent side, contends that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi by his order of 30 Oct. 1956 made in exercise of the power vested in him by section 232 of the Punjab Municipal Act 1911 and has a authority to revise the existing scale of pay of any of their employees and granting special pecuniary benefits.
Mr. Baldev Mehta, from the petitioners side, challenged the legitimacy of the Chief Commissioner’s directive on the basis that it exceeded the parameters delineated in section 232 of the act, asserting that the committee was not afforded the opportunity to proffer an explanation as mandate by section 235, nor was any conclusive order issued pursuant to that section. Mr. Mehta raised objection asserting that the municipal committee was deprived of the requisite opportunity to present its case against the Chief Commissioner’s order, as mandated by Section 235 of the Act. He contends that the committee is entitled to a hearing, and such an opportunity cannot be circumvented under the provisions of section 232.
According to him, the non-compliance with this requirement has rendered the order void and ineffective. He asserted that the appropriate statutory provision empowering the authorities to act section 42, thereby rendering section 232 inapplicable. Under this provision, a Deputy Commissioner possesses the authority to scrutinize excessive expenditures by the Committee and mandate a reduction in the remuneration of any of its employees; however, such actions cannot be executed preemptively.
Judgement
The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the employees, stating that the resolution passed in November 1, 1957 was beyond its jurisdiction and the order of the commissioner, is invalid as it violated the principle of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in the constitution. The Court highlighted that public authorities must act reasonably and not in an arbitrary manner and public authorities must adhere to principles of natural justice.
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