Supreme Court of India Case number: 2970-2971 of 2012 Petitioner Maniben Devraj Shah Respondent Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai Bench G.S Singhvi S.J Mukhopadhaya, JJ.
Act:
Section 5 Limitation Act
Section 314 of the Bombay municipal corporation act
Case Facts
The appellants filed suits for grant of a declaration that notices issues by the Corporation Act, 1888, for demolition of the properties specified in the plaints are illegal and not binding on them. They pleaded that the action taken by the Corporation is discriminatory and should be annulled because some persons whose structures were taken for road widening were allowed to construct mezzanine floor in the remaining portions of their respective properties and were also allotted alternative accommodation in the new building but were not given similar benefit.
The appellants further pleaded that they had entered into development agreements with Shamji D. Shah and Popatbhai Baghbhai Bharwad for the construction of the property and they will construct market for and on the behalf of the corporation. They prayed for the issue of direction to the respondent to provide shops in the market proposed to be constructed near Purnapragya High School, Bharucha Marg, Dahisar East Bombay.
Argument
In the written statement proffered on behalf of the corporation, a challenge was articulated regarding the suit’s maintainability, predicated upon the assertion that notice pursuant to Section 527 of the Act had not been duly issued. It was pleaded that the appellants built something on part of the road, and it needs to be torn down to make the road wider.
On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed identical issues for all the cases. After looking at the evidence presented by both parties, the court decreed the suits by separate but identical judgements dated 2-5-2003. The corporation failed to contest the trial court’s judgement within the stipulated timeframe set forth by the Limitation Act and subsequently lodged appeals in September 2010, along with the affidavits of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar and condonation of 7 years and 108 days delay, and states that the papers which were required for preferring the first appeal were misplaced and not traceable in spite of good efforts.
The appellants vehemently challenged the Corporation’s plea for condonation of delay, contending that the narrative surrounding the alleged misplacement of documents is implausible and warrants outright rejection. They further argued that the applications for condonation conspicuously fail to specify when the purportedly misplaced documents were subsequently recovered by the relevant department. They further pleaded that the transfer of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar from one section to the other is irrelevant to the matter of condonation of delay, as the corporation has retained multiple legal counsel and has failed to provide any justification for the failure to submit applications for certified copies of the trial court’s judgement until 23-08-2010. The Single Judge of the High Court referred to the judgements of Court in Collector v. Katiji (1987) and State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao (2005), condoned the delay, and asserted that condoning of delay is sufficient and delay deserves to be condoned.
The A.S. Bhasme, counsel representing the appellants, contended that the rational proffered by the Single Judge for condoning a delay exceeding 7 years and 3 months in the submission of the appeals is devoid of legal merit, thereby rendering the impugned order susceptible to annulment. The counsel emphasised that, in the absence of any repudiation by the corporation regarding its possession of battery of advocates adept at managing litigation, the reassignment of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar to the miscellaneous court and subsequently to the other judicial forums is immaterial to the question of delay.
This is particularly pertinent given that the suits initiated by the appellants were adjudicated in May 2003, with no cogent justification proffered for the failure to submit applications for certified copies over a protracted span of 7 years and 5 months. Shri Bhasme further contended that the narrative surrounding the alleged misplacement of documents was a fabrication orchestrated by the corporation, which the High Court subsequently dismissed. The court found the assertions regarding this matter to be fundamentally ambiguous, lacking any specificity concerning the timeline of when the documents were purportedly located or the identity of the individual responsible for them. In support of his argument, Shri Bhasme relied upon the judgement of Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corp. (2010).
Shri Pallav Shishodia, learned senior counsel appearing for the corporation, argued that the discretion exercised by the single judge of the high court to condone the delay does not suffer from any legal infirmity, and asserted that this court may, on a fresh analysis of the pleadings of the parties, form a different opinion does not furnish a valid ground for exercise of power under Article 136 of the constitution. In support of his argument, Shri Shishodis relied upon the judgements in Collector v. Katiji (1987), where the Shri Shishodia also pointed out that the appellants had raised illegal construction and if the challenge to the decrees passed by the trial court was aborted by the High Court by refusing to condone the delay, serious injury would have been caused to the public interest.
Shri Shishodia emphasized that the Limitation Act of 1963 has been acted with the objected of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by legislature, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant.
The expression “sufficient cause” used in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard and fast rule has been or can laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but a liberal approach should be adopted, that the substantive rights of the parties are not defeated merely because of delay. In the State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao (2005), the court referred to several precedents where what counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion.
The court duly acknowledged the pervasive bureaucratic inertia inherent in the operations of the state and its various agencies/instrumentalities. Consequently, it must be apprised of the underlying spirit and philosophical tenets of the relevant provisions when interpreting the concept of “sufficient cause”. The principle of merit must take precedence over the mere technicalities surrounding delays in the submission of appeals.
It is imperative to underscore that while a liberal and justice-centric approach is warranted in the exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and analogous statutes, the court cannot disregard the reality that a successful litigant has accrued certain rights based on the judgement in question. Furthermore, substantial time is expended at multiple junctures of litigation, in addition to the financial burdens incurred.
Reasoning
What colour the expression is sufficient cause would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.
In case of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision-making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and or its instrumentalities/agencies and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest.
In the light of the foregoing, it is incumbent upon the court to ascertain whether the respondent’s justification for the condonation of a delay exceeding 7 years and 3 months is adequate, and whether the learned Single Judge of the High Court has appropriately adhered to the principles enunciated by this court in the exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
The learned Single Judge of the High Court altogether ignored the gapping holes in the narrative proffered, particularly regarding the inexplicable indifference exhibited by the parties in failing to initiate applications for the issuance of certified copies of the judgement for an inordinate span exceeding 7 years.
Judgement
The Court ruled that the cause shown by the corporation for delayed filing of the appeals was, to say the least, wholly unsatisfactory and the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for condoning more than 7 years delay cannot but be treated as poo apology for the exercise of discretion by the court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the judgements of the trial court are dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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