BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Historically, Delhi has experienced and was part of material changes in the matters of administrative/political and governance. Initially, under British rule, through legislative statutes, Delhi was classified as a “chief commissioner’s province”, meaning that the governor-general would directly govern by way of appointing a chief commissioner, who in turn reports to the former.
Following this, during the period of post-independence, Delhi was redefined as a Part C state, according to the Government of Part C States Act, of 1951. Wherein, being a Part C state, authorizes the Legislative Assembly (LA) of Delhi to enact or pass laws regarding the matters listed in the State List of the 7th Schedule of the Indian Constitution. In specific the power to make laws is restricted to matters relating to public utilities and water supply. Where matters such as “police, public order, and land” weren’t within their authority or jurisdiction to make laws.
In the year, 1956, Delhi was categorized as a Union Territory (UT) by the States Reorganization Act, 1956, this in turn resulted in the dissolution of the Council of Ministers (CoM) and legislative assembly, existing at that time. In the following year, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi was established, having its distinct administrative provisions through the Municipal Corporation of Delhi Act, 1957, wherein allowed Delhi as UT to have its own and more elected governance.
In the year 1966, owing to demands of the public requiring statehood and more involvement of elected governance, the Statue Delhi Administration Act, of 1966 was passed. This resulted in the establishment of the Delhi Metropolitan Council, encompassing nearly fifty-six members elected and five members nominated by the Lieutenant Governor (LG). The council acted only in the capacity of an advisory role and the LG mentioned here replaced the Chief Commissioner as administrator of Delhi.
In the year 1991, there was an important change due to the enactment of the sixty-ninth constitutional amendment and the Government of NCT of Delhi Act, 1991. Wherein, through this amendment and enactment, Delhi gained partial statehood, meaning that there was the introduction of the “Legislative Assembly and Council of Ministers”. They were subject to limited legislative and executive powers, but still the jurisdiction regarding “police, land, and public order” was within the jurisdiction of the Union Government
FACTS
The basic facts are that Delhi is prominently known as the National Capital Territory (NCT), a metropolitan, and a UT, which includes New Delhi, the capital of India. As already stated, Delhi, as a UT, has its distinct administrative status, wherein it possesses limited statehood and an elected LA and CoM. This status is not the same as that of other UTs in India.
ISSUES
- Whether the government of NCTD or the Union government-appointed LG have administrative, legislative, and executive powers over matters relating to “services” in Entry 41 of the State List in Delhi?
- Whether the administrative relationship between the NCTD government and LG can be managed to maintain governance as per the constitution?
- What is the rightful way of interpreting Article 239AA, regarding the issues of powers and limitations with respect to Entry 41 of the State List?
ARGUMENTS
Appellant’s Arguments
The government of NCTD argued that excluding the use of the “legislative assembly” of NCTD in matters relating to services is not reasonable, due to the mere use of the term “state” instead. They asserted that the administrative status of NCTD was officially recognized under Article 239AA of the Constitution, though with a limited statehood, it possesses a Legislative Assembly like any other normal state with legislative powers.
The government of NCTD also argued that the amendment introduced in the year 2021, reduces the powers and functions of the elected LA in Delhi while making the LG to be the “default administrative authority” in all matters about NCTD.
They urge the court to declare that this constitutional amendment damages the basic features of federalism, separation of powers, rule of law, and representative democracy and is hence unconstitutional.
They further, argued that “legislative competence” exists irrespective of whether it was underutilized or not over particular matters. Therefore interpreting, that the NCTD government not utilizing its legislative powers does not mean the authority has been cessed or such.
The NCTD government also emphasized that Article 239AA should be interpreted as an “enabling clause”, which provides the UT the power to legislate and administer matters relating to or as provided in the state list.
Finally, they stated that the amendment should be held unconstitutional due to the fact that, it is in contrast to the basic constitutional principles like federalism, separation of powers, rule of law, and democracy.
Respondent Arguments
The respondent the Union government, argued that the jurisdiction provided under Entry 41 of the State List relating to state public services, was certainly not brought up or addressed in the 2018 judgement, concerning the management of powers between the NCTD government and the Union government.
The respondent points out the need for a “contextual interpretation” of the State List, that recognized the “sui generis” status of NCTD. The Union on the one hand acknowledges the legislative status of NCTD but, on the other, asserts that the NCTD cannot exercise their power over matters relating to services. Owing to the reason that it pertains to the interests and connection of the union to the capital.
Lastly, the union contended that the phrase “insofar as matters applied to Union Territories”, under Article 239AA is a restrictive clause and not an enabling clause. They claimed this because this provision limits the extent to which the Union Territories can have the power to legislate and administer matters in the State List.
JUDGEMENT
The judgment of the case is considered to be a landmark, as it addresses the complex balance between the powers of the government of NCTD and the Union. This was emphasized by the constitutional principle “triple chain of accountability”, wherein the chain indicates the public servants are accountable to the Council of Ministers, and in turn, the CoM is accountable to the legislature, and finally the legislature to the public. In that context, the court held that interrupting this chain of accountability would cause an imbalance and deprive the powers of the government of NCTD in controlling matters relating to services. This, in the end, will again diminish the accountability that is inherent in a democratic setup.
The court shed light on the fact that granting power and control over the services matter to the Central would change power dynamics to an improper level and change the mechanism of holding authorities accountable. This tends to avoid the democratic mandated principles of the NCTD, which is in line with the “comprehensive principles of federalism and representative democracy”.
The court finally held that the Delhi government has the power to manage services such, as IAS and Joint Cadre officers working in the NCT of Delhi even if they were not recruited directly by the government itself. It emphasized that any attempt to expand Union control beyond what’s allowed by the constitution would disrupt the system of governance.