In the Supreme Court of India
Cases no. 297 & 298 of 1951
Citation: AIR 1952 SC 75
Equivalent Citation: AIR 2018 SC 357
Petitioner: State of West Bengal
Respondent: Anwar Ali Sarkar
Date of Judgement: 11/01/1952
Bench: (CJI) Patanjali Shastri, Saiyid Fazal Ali, M.C. Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjee, S.R. Das, N. Chandrashekar Aiyar, Vivian Bose
INTRODUCTION:
One of the seminal instances in India’s legal history is the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar. The West Bengal Special Courts Act, its interpretation, Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, the State government’s discretionary power, the preamble test of equality before the law, the need for a speedy trial. Reasonable grounds for discrimination were all addressed in the aforementioned case. The State of Bengal filed an appeal with the Indian Supreme Court to overturn the ruling made by the High Court of Calcutta. The petitioner objected to citing Article 14.
Additionally, section 5(1) of the act was challenged constitutionally because it grants the state government the arbitrary ability to assign any “case” or “class of cases” to Special Courts without providing a rational classification. The inclusion of any one “case” outside of the “class of cases” was another aspect of the problem. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the act unconstitutional because it grants the state government arbitrary power, which they may use biasedly, emotionally, or for their gain. As a result, the act violates the principles of equal protection under the law and equality before the law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
- To expedite the trials of certain cases that the State Government was to refer to Special Courts for, West Bengal Special Courts were established under section 3 of the West Bengal Special Courts Ordinance, 1949 (Ordinance No. 3 of 1949). This ordinance was replaced in March 1950 by the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 (West Bengal Act X of 1950).
- Mr Anwar Ali and 49 other people were tried by the Special Court under a notification under section 5 of the aforementioned Act for a variety of offences they were accused of committing during their armed gang raid of the Jessop Factory. The defendants were found guilty and given varying prison sentences.
- Section 5 of the aforementioned act is unconstitutional and void under Article 13(2)[3] of the Indian Constitution because it denied the respondent equal protection of laws enjoined by Article 14[4] of the Indian Constitution. Accordingly, the accused applied in the High Court under Article 226[2] of the Indian Constitution for the issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the conviction and sentence.
- The Chief Justice and four other justices made up the full bench of the High Court, which overturned the conviction and ordered. The respondent and the other accused parties to be tried under the law. Thus, the request for review.
COURT’S DECISION:
The West Bengal Special Courts Act’s Section 5(1) was declared invalid by the Supreme Court because it gave the government the arbitrary authority to categorize cases or offences as it saw fit. Additionally, the Act did not establish any policies or guidelines for the exercise of discretion in the classification of cases or offences. The Act established a trial process for special courts that differed significantly from the criminal procedure court’s standard procedure for trials of general offences. The goal of the Act and the differentia that serve as the foundation for classification are two different things. What is required is that the Act’s purpose, which establishes the classification, and the grounds for classification must be related.
Legislation establishing a categorization can only be deemed discriminatory if there is no justifiable basis for it. Therefore, no one will assert that they are competent to enter into contracts between themselves, even if the legislature decides what age constitutes contempt. No agreement may be conditioned on a person’s height or hair colour. This kind of categorization will be subjective. Administrative directives or instructions provided by the government to its officers are not covered by the law. Discrimination is prohibited in both substantive and procedural legislation.
RATIO DECIDENDI AND OBITER DICTA:
Harries C.J. applied the test known as “reasonable classification,” and it was determined that while the need for a quicker trial than what is permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure. It may serve as the basis for reasonable classification, Article 14 of the Constitution is violated because it gives the State government the arbitrary and absolute power to refer cases. “Whether or not the duration of such case is likely to be long,” to special courts for trial.
Das Gupta J. agreed with Harries C.J.’s ruling because, despite the preamble clearly stating the act’s main purpose, general expressions used in the act’s provisions would imply that the legislature intended to grant an arbitrary power of reference. Which would be incompatible with the constitutional ban on discrimination, which the legislature was presumed to have known about when it purposefully re-enacted. The old Ordinance’s provisions. Furthermore, the State Government may have total discretion in choosing which matters to send to a special court and may not be susceptible to judicial review.
All people inside India’s borders are protected by Article 14 from arbitrary laws and arbitrary legal proceedings. Article 13 clarifies this further by defining “law” to include, among other things, any “order” or “notification,” meaning that even executive orders or notifications cannot violate Article 14. Furthermore, the question of whether a categorization is acceptable only arises when a specific law that affects a group of people is contested as discriminatory. It also cannot occur when executive directives or notifications that target specific persons are criticized for being biased.
According to Fazl Ali J., the act’s drafters simply duplicated the 1949 Ordinance’s provisions, which were put into effect at a time when the current Constitution’s article 14 was non-existent. Additionally, the Criminal Procedure Code’s framers recognized the importance of a prompt trial in a few categories of cases, and with this goal in mind, they created four distinct sets of provisions for the trial of four categories of cases: summary trials, summons cases, warrant cases, and cases triable by a court of session. In general, they classified offences by these several sets of regulations; but, they also took the trying magistrate’s authority and experience into account when determining whether offences qualified for a summary trial.
However, the contested act has entirely disregarded the Code’s categorization principle and has instead established a new procedure without attempting to categorize or particularize the offences or instances to which it would be applied. The most important portion of the statute, section 5, misstates what it means for the specific Court to try crimes or groups of crimes that the state government may mandate by general or specific written order. As previously said, the act is a replica of the previous Ordinance, which was drafted before the Constitution’s enactment. As a result, Article 14 could not have been on the minds of those responsible for drafting it, as it did not exist at the time.
According to Mahajan J., there is no classification in the true sense of the word since it is not predicated on any traits that are unique to individuals or situations that need to follow the act’s specified particular procedure. The statute is exempt from the equality clause of Article 14 merely by its classification.
Individuals involved in crimes or cases deemed to require expedited trial procedures have the right to ask questions such as: “Why are they being subjected to a law that has circumvented the standard trial procedure? Why have they been placed in that category and denied the protections and safeguards that are permitted in the case of accused rights under the procedure mentioned in the Criminal Procedure Code? What makes the legislature or the executive think that the cases need expedited trial than those of others like them?”
The act has fully delegated this topic to the province government’s unchecked discretion.
Das J. There is no denying that the Indian Constitution’s provisions must be taken into consideration while determining the constitutionality of section 5 of the contested act. It is evident from a comparison of the wording used in certain portions of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the challenged act that the Act has beyond the Code’s guidelines and cannot in any way be considered a safe replacement for the process the Code prescribes. Merely mentioning that the warrant procedure under the code entails a committal by the trial Magistrate, to himself, is insufficient to ignore the far-reaching effects of the elimination of committal proceedings, as the warrant procedure reduces the likelihood that the prosecution will be dismissed at the preliminary stage.
The preamble of the Act states that the Act’s goal cannot serve as the foundation for classification, and section 5(1) grants the state government unrestrained and unguided classification authority that it may use arbitrarily or “with an evil eye and an unequal band.”
Section 6 of the Act stipulates that Special Courts have the authority to recognize an offence without requiring the accused to appear in person for trial and that when an accused person is tried, the process for warrant case trials by magistrates must be followed. When a warrant case is brought before a magistrate, the same officer who filed the initial charges also hears the case at the end. Conversely, in the Sessions case, a different judge who was unrelated to the previous proceeding is hearing the case.
Additionally, it was evident that the committal occurred before the Sessions Judge hearing the matter; usually, a long period, which provides the accused plenty of time to get ready for his defense. Even if the magistrate grants an adjournment after the charge is prepared, he will not be entitled to the same benefit in a warrant case. This is one of the cases where the Special Courts Act deviates from standard practice.
It is said that discretion should only be used in cases where a quicker trial is required. Since there might be many levels of speediness, the word “speedier,” which is employed in this context to describe something comparative, surely adds an element of uncertainty and variability. It doesn’t matter how admirable and high-minded the intentions are. The question I pose to myself is this: Under the current circumstances in India, can men who are impartial, unbiased, resolute, and free from bias and emotion view this with objectivity and regard it as reasonable, just, and fair, treating it as the equal treatment and protection of liberties that one would expect of a sovereign democratic republic?
To that, I have only one response. I would rule in this case and declare the Act invalid based on those brief and basic grounds.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS:
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India ruled in favour of Anwar Ali Sarkar in the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar case, declaring the West Bengal Special Courts Act unconstitutional because it violated Article 14 of the Indian Constitution by granting the State Government arbitrary, unchecked, and unguided power that could be used in an unreasonable and biased manner and by restricting the equal protection of the law. There was no logical way for “cases,” “classes of cases,” “offences,” and “classes of offences” to be categorized under the Act.
Furthermore, it was decided that the way cases were already classified under the Code of Criminal Procedure was reasonable and did not conflict with the way cases were classified in the contested Act. Furthermore, there was no sufficient need for the Act because the Code already classified instances that must be given a prompt trial.
The 1949 Act was amended by the State Government, changing some clauses within the Act. This was interpreted as an intentional disregard by the State Government for the exercise of arbitrary authority of reference.
SUGGESTIONS
The West Bengal Special Courts Act did not lessen judges’ judicial power or authority, but it did grant the State Government the arbitrary ability to refer matters to special courts. Because the judiciary was not placed under the authority of the State Government, justice would still have been served even if the cases had been arbitrarily referred to the Special Courts.
The State Government was also deemed to have erred when they re-enacted the Act without making any changes to the previous ordinance and failed to take into account the fact that the ordinance was passed before 1950 and might therefore have been missing certain provisions of the Indian Constitution.
There were numerous facets to the issue, and the Honourable Supreme Court clarified the extent of Article 14 in the decision. Not entirely, but with a majority and explanations for the rulings, the case that overturned the State of West Bengal’s appeal was closely scrutinized.
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