Case Details
Case Name: Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Chief Justice Hiralal J. Kania, Justice M. Patanjali Sastri, Justice B.K. Mukherjea, Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das and Justice N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar
Date of Judgment: 5 October 1951
Citation: AIR 1951 SC 458; 1952 SCR 89
Introduction
The power to amend a constitution is essential for adapting constitutional institutions to changing social, political and economic circumstances. At the same time, unrestricted amendment power may potentially threaten fundamental rights and the basic principles of constitutional governance. The question of how far Parliament could go in amending the Constitution arose at an early stage of Indian constitutional development.
Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India was the first major Supreme Court decision concerning the extent of Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution, particularly when such amendment affected Fundamental Rights. The case arose from a challenge to the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which inserted Articles 31A and 31B into the Constitution. The Amendment was primarily intended to protect agrarian reform legislation, particularly laws abolishing zamindari, from constitutional challenges based on Fundamental Rights.
The central constitutional question was whether Parliament, while exercising its power under Article 368, could amend provisions relating to Fundamental Rights. The petitioners argued that Article 13(2) prohibited Parliament from making any law that abridged Fundamental Rights. The Supreme Court rejected this contention and upheld the First Amendment, establishing an important early interpretation of the constitutional amending power.
Facts of the Case
After the Constitution came into force, several State Governments enacted legislation aimed at abolishing the zamindari system and introducing agrarian reforms. These laws affected the rights and interests of zamindars, who challenged their constitutional validity on the ground that they violated Fundamental Rights, particularly the right to property.
Different High Courts reached different conclusions regarding the validity of these agrarian reform laws. The Patna High Court declared the Bihar legislation unconstitutional, while the High Courts of Allahabad and Nagpur upheld the corresponding legislation in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. Several matters concerning these laws were also pending before the Supreme Court.
In response to these constitutional difficulties, the Union Government introduced the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill, 1951. The Amendment inserted Articles 31A and 31B into the Constitution.
Article 31A was intended to protect certain laws relating to the acquisition of estates and modification or extinguishment of rights in estates from being invalidated merely because they violated Fundamental Rights.
Article 31B provided additional protection to specified Acts and Regulations included in the Ninth Schedule, declaring that they would not be deemed void merely because they were inconsistent with or abridged Fundamental Rights.
The Amendment was passed by the provisional Parliament and received presidential assent. Several zamindars, including Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo, challenged the constitutional validity of the First Amendment before the Supreme Court under Article 32.
The petitioners argued that Parliament had no power to amend Fundamental Rights because Article 13(2) prohibited the State from making any law that took away or abridged the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. They also questioned the procedure followed for passing the Amendment and the competence of the provisional Parliament to exercise the amending power.
Issues Before the Court
The Supreme Court was required to determine several constitutional questions:
- Whether Parliament had the power under Article 368 to amend the Constitution in a manner that affected or abridged Fundamental Rights.
- Whether a constitutional amendment made under Article 368 constituted “law” within the meaning of Article 13(2).
- Whether the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Article 368.
- Whether the provisional Parliament was competent to exercise the power of constitutional amendment.
- Whether Articles 31A and 31B required ratification by the States under the proviso to Article 368 because they affected the jurisdiction of constitutional courts.
- Whether Parliament lacked legislative competence to enact Articles 31A and 31B because the subject of land was included in the State List.
Arguments of the Parties
- Arguments of the Petitioners
The petitioners challenged the First Amendment on several grounds.
Their principal argument was that Article 13(2) prevented Parliament from abridging Fundamental Rights. According to them, the term “law” in Article 13(2) was sufficiently broad to include constitutional amendments. Therefore, if an amendment took away or abridged Fundamental Rights, it would be unconstitutional.
They further argued that Article 368 was only procedural and did not itself confer substantive power upon Parliament to amend every provision of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, Parliament could not use Article 368 to destroy or curtail Fundamental Rights.
Another argument was that the provisional Parliament was not competent to exercise the amending power because Article 368 contemplated a Parliament consisting of two Houses, whereas the provisional Parliament did not have the same constitutional structure.
The petitioners also contended that the First Amendment had not followed the exact procedure prescribed by Article 368 because the Bill was amended during its passage through Parliament.
They additionally argued that Articles 31A and 31B affected the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts under Articles 132, 136 and 226 and therefore required ratification by the States under Article 368.
- Arguments of the Union of India
The Union Government defended the constitutional validity of the First Amendment.
It argued that the power exercised under Article 368 was constituent power, which was fundamentally different from ordinary legislative power. Therefore, the expression “law” in Article 13(2) referred to ordinary legislation and not to constitutional amendments.
The Union further argued that the provisional Parliament possessed the necessary powers to exercise the constitutional amending function and that the procedure prescribed under Article 368 had been properly followed.
With respect to Articles 31A and 31B, the Government maintained that these provisions did not alter the powers of the Supreme Court or High Courts. Instead, they altered the constitutional protection available to certain classes of laws. Consequently, ratification by the States was unnecessary.
Judgment
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutional validity of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, and dismissed the petitions challenging it.
The Court held that the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 was a constituent power, distinct from ordinary legislative power.
The Court further held that the word “law” in Article 13(2) did not include a constitutional amendment made in exercise of the power under Article 368. Consequently, Article 13(2) could not be used to invalidate an amendment merely because it affected or abridged Fundamental Rights.
The Court also upheld the competence of the provisional Parliament to exercise the amending power and rejected the objections concerning the procedure adopted for passing the First Amendment.
With regard to Articles 31A and 31B, the Court held that they did not alter the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or High Courts. They merely excluded certain classes of laws from the operation of particular Fundamental Rights. Therefore, they did not require ratification by the State legislatures under Article 368.
The First Amendment was consequently declared valid and constitutional.
Reasoning of the Court
The most important aspect of the judgment was the Court’s interpretation of the relationship between Articles 13 and 368.
- Constitutional Amendment and Ordinary Law
The Court distinguished between two types of legal power: ordinary legislative power and constituent power.
Article 13(2) provides that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the Fundamental Rights conferred by Part III. The petitioners argued that a constitutional amendment was also a “law” and therefore subject to Article 13(2).
The Court rejected this interpretation. It held that the word “law” in Article 13(2) referred to ordinary legislative enactments made in exercise of legislative power. A constitutional amendment under Article 368 was made in exercise of constituent power and therefore did not fall within the prohibition contained in Article 13(2).
This distinction was crucial. If constitutional amendments were treated as ordinary “laws” under Article 13(2), Parliament would effectively be unable to amend Fundamental Rights. The Court found no such limitation in the constitutional scheme as it then existed.
- Scope of Article 368
The Court treated Article 368 as providing the constitutional mechanism for amendment. Parliament, when acting under this provision, was not merely performing its ordinary legislative function. It was exercising a special constitutional power.
The Court therefore concluded that Parliament could amend provisions of the Constitution, including those relating to Fundamental Rights, provided that the procedure prescribed by Article 368 was followed.
- Articles 31A and 31B
The Court next considered whether the insertion of Articles 31A and 31B affected the jurisdiction of constitutional courts.
The petitioners argued that these provisions deprived the High Courts and Supreme Court of their ability to examine the validity of laws and therefore required ratification by the States.
The Court rejected this argument. It explained that the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts remained intact. High Courts continued to possess their power under Article 226, and the Supreme Court continued to possess its appellate jurisdiction.
What changed was the constitutional status of certain laws. Articles 31A and 31B protected specified categories of legislation from being invalidated on the ground of inconsistency with particular Fundamental Rights. Thus, the provisions did not directly amend the jurisdiction of the courts.
- Legislative Competence
The petitioners also argued that Parliament could not deal with matters relating to land because land was included in the State List.
The Court rejected this contention because Articles 31A and 31B were not ordinary laws dealing with land. They were constitutional provisions. The authority to amend the Constitution was derived from Article 368, and therefore Parliament was competent to enact constitutional amendments even when the subject matter of the amendment related to matters otherwise falling within the State List.
- Significance of the Constitutional Position
The judgment therefore adopted a broad understanding of Parliament’s amending power. At this stage of constitutional jurisprudence, the Court did not recognise any implied limitation preventing Parliament from amending Fundamental Rights.
This position later became the subject of significant constitutional controversy and was reconsidered in subsequent cases such as Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan and, most importantly, I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab. The doctrine eventually developed further in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, where the Supreme Court recognised the basic structure doctrine.
Significance of the Judgment
Shankari Prasad v. Union of India occupies a foundational position in the history of India’s constitutional amendment jurisprudence.
First, it established the principle that constitutional amendments were not “law” within the meaning of Article 13(2). Consequently, Parliament could amend Fundamental Rights through the procedure prescribed by Article 368.
Second, the judgment recognised the distinction between legislative power and constituent power. This distinction became central to later debates concerning the limits of Parliament’s constitutional amending authority.
Third, the decision validated the First Constitutional Amendment, which was significant for protecting agrarian reform legislation from challenges based on Fundamental Rights. Articles 31A and 31B subsequently became important instruments for protecting certain land reform and other legislation.
Fourth, the judgment represents the first major stage in the evolution of the basic structure debate. Although the Court upheld an unrestricted amendment power at this stage, later decisions gradually reconsidered this approach. In Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967), the Supreme Court took the opposite position and held that Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights. This was later modified by Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), which established that Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution is subject to the basic structure of the Constitution.
Thus, Shankari Prasad is important not only for what it decided but also because it became the starting point of a long constitutional debate over whether Parliament’s amending power is unlimited.
Conclusion
Shankari Prasad v. Union of India was a landmark decision in the early development of Indian constitutional law. The Supreme Court upheld the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, and adopted a broad interpretation of Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution.
The Court’s central holding was that a constitutional amendment made under Article 368 was an exercise of constituent power and was therefore not “law” within the meaning of Article 13(2). As a result, Parliament could amend Fundamental Rights under the constitutional framework then prevailing.
Although the decision was subsequently questioned and its approach was eventually transformed by later cases, its historical importance remains substantial. It provided the initial judicial foundation for the understanding that Parliament possessed a wide power to amend the Constitution.
The constitutional journey from Shankari Prasad to Golaknath and ultimately Kesavananda Bharati illustrates the evolving balance between constitutional flexibility and constitutional supremacy. The case therefore remains indispensable for understanding the development of the doctrine governing the limits of Parliament’s amending power.
References
- Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar, AIR 1951 SC 458; 1952 SCR 89.
- https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1706770/
- Constitution of India, art 13, 31A, 31B and 368.
- Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.
- Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845.
- Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965) – LawArticle
- I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.
- Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
- https://lawarticle.in/the-basic-structure-doctrine-a-legal-analysis-of-kesavananda-bharati-v-state-of-kerala/
